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講座預告 | 考慮社會責任的供應商集中度和審核優先級研究

發布時間:2021-01-04    來源:

講座時間:1月7日(周四) 上午9:00

參會地點:25教學樓3樓3B教室

主講人:齊安焱




主講人介紹:

齊安焱(Anyan Qi)是美國德克薩斯大學達拉斯分校,納文·金達爾管理學院副教授。2008年獲清華大學信息科學與技術學院的自動化學士學位和經濟學學士學位。2014年獲美國密歇根大學羅斯商學院的技術和運營博士學位。2014年至今,加入納文·金達爾管理學院。他目前的研究重點是現代供應鏈中的戰略采購和產能管理。在他的研究中,他使用了隨機動態編程,數據驅動的優化,博弈論和行為實驗的工具。在管理類頂級期刊Operations Research、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management,近5年發表學術論文6篇,F任Production and Operations Management期刊的Senior Editor。


講座內容:

Most supply networks are characterized by firms that source from multiple suppliers and suppliers that serve multiple firms, thus resulting in suppliers who differ in their degree centrality, i.e., the number of firms they supply to. In such networks, any negative publicity from suppliers' noncompliance of socially responsible practices – e.g., employment of child labor, unsafe working conditions, and excessive pollution – can significantly damage the reputation of the buying firms. To mitigate this impact, firms preemptively audit suppliers, although resource and time considerations typically restrict the number of suppliers a firm can audit. Therefore, a key question is whether firms should prioritize the auditing of suppliers with low or high centrality, ceteris paribus. To investigate, we consider an assembly network consisting of two firms (buyers) and three suppliers – each firm has one independent supplier who uniquely supplies to that firm and one common supplier who supplies to both.


Using the game-theoretic analysis, we show that downstream competition between the firms drives them away from auditing the supplier with higher centrality; i.e., the common supplier, in equilibrium, despite the fact that auditing this supplier is better for the aggregate profit of the firms. We also show that this inefficiency is corrected when the firms cooperate (via a stable coalition) to jointly audit the suppliers and share the auditing cost in a fair manner. In addition, we identify conditions under which joint auditing improves social welfare.

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